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Abstract—There is an especially strong need in modern large-
scale data analysis to prioritize samples for manual inspection.
For example, the inspection could target important mislabeled
samples or key vulnerabilities exploitable by an adversarial
attack. In order to solve the “needle in the haystack" problem
of which samples to inspect, we develop a new scalable version
of Cook’s distance, a classical statistical technique for identifying
samples which unusually strongly impact the fit of a regression
model (and its downstream predictions). In order to scale this
technique up to very large and high-dimensional datasets, we
introduce a new algorithm which we call “influence sketch-
ing." Influence sketching embeds random projections within
the influence computation; in particular, the influence score is
calculated using the randomly projected pseudo-dataset from
the post-convergence Generalized Linear Model (GLM). We
validate that influence sketching can reliably and successfully
discover influential samples by applying the technique to a
malware detection dataset of over 2 million executable files, each
represented with almost 100,000 features. For example, we find
that randomly deleting approximately 10% of training samples
reduces predictive accuracy only slightly from 99.47% to 99.45%,
whereas deleting the same number of samples with high influence
sketch scores reduces predictive accuracy all the way down to
90.24%. Moreover, we find that influential samples are especially
likely to be mislabeled. In the case study, we manually inspect
the most influential samples, and find that influence sketching
pointed us to new, previously unidentified pieces of malware.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Sample influence scores have been largely neglected in
modern large-scale data analysis, perhaps considered a mere
anachronism in the historical context of science experiments
which explored model behavior with and without a handful
of aberrant cases. However, sample influence scores can help
solve the “needle in the haystack" problem in modern data
analysis: where in a corpus of many millions of samples should
one devote one’s attention? Modern datasets can be of such
enormous sizes that human experts may have had a small-
to-nonexistent role in their creation. However, human experts
may be available to provide a deeper analysis of some but
not all samples. A scalable measure of sample influence could
1This work is copyrighted by the IEEE. Personal use of this material is
permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertis-
ing or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale
or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of
this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.
solve this queueing problem, prioritizing samples which have
the largest model impact.
Consider, for example, two special cases. First, modern
large-scale datasets are often labeled by a heuristic or algo-
rithm, introducing the problem of label noise [5]. For example,
in the field of cybersecurity, there are not enough professional
reverse engineers to analyze every new piece of software
that encounters the world’s computers; thus, the security of
software is traditionally determined based on whether “signa-
tures" of maliciousness have been satisfied. Similarly, in the
field of natural language processing, inexpensive labeling from
non-experts can be often obtained for huge datasets through
Mechanical Turk2; however, this labeling can be substantially
less reliable than labeling by experts [5]. A scalable measure
of sample influence could point towards potentially mislabeled
samples, particularly those with pernicious model impact. Sec-
ond, even high-performing models can harbor vulnerabilities,
as in the now well-known example of the model that learned to
discriminate between wolves and huskies through background
“snow features" [13]. Because the model’s decision making
was based not on physical features, but on background snow,
the model was vulnerable to attack. A scalable measure of
sample influence could point towards important vulnerabilities
in the model, therefore subserving a primary goal of adver-
sarial learning.
In this paper, we present an attempt to revive, modernize,
and scale up a technique from classical statistics of the late
1970s: a measure of sample influence known as Cook’s Dis-
tance [2]. In particular, we focus on Generalized Cook’s Dis-
tance [12], which can identify influential samples with respect
to any regression model (linear, logistic, Poisson, beta, etc.)
in the family of Generalized Linear Models. Cook’s Distance
deems a sample influential when its inclusion causes “strange"
(or unexpected) perturbations in the regression weights. As we
will see, these influential samples can have a strong impact
on a model’s predictions about future samples. High influence
scores are associated with samples that are hard to predict and
tend to lie in unusual locations of feature space (in a way that
depends upon principal component subspaces, as described
more precisely below).
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Cook’s Distance has a key feature that makes it an excellent
candidate for scaling up the large datasets: it can compare
the fit of a regression model to a set of n regression models,
each of which omits one sample from the training set, without
the user actually having to run n separate regression models.
Indeed, in modern data analysis, running n regressions can
be quite difficult: there may be very many high-dimensional
samples, and the chosen regression model (e.g. a logistic lasso
regression) may be computationally expensive to fit. At the
same time, however, the construction of Generalized Cook’s
Distance involves matrix operations (especially, forming and
inverting a n× n covariance matrix) that can easily render it
computationally infeasible on large data sets.
To solve this problem, we present an influence sketching
procedure, which extends Generalized Cook’s Distance to
large scale regressions by embedding random projections [1]
within its construction. For a dataset with n samples and p pre-
dictors, the algorithm has approximate worst-case complexity
of O(np log(n)), with potentially lower complexity when the
dataset and/or projection matrix is sparse. We argue analyti-
cally, and demonstrate empirically, that “influence sketching"
can successfully identify impactful samples in large-scale
regressions. In the presence of label noise, the technique is
particularly valuable; if an expert can assess ground truth
with high accuracy relative to the labeling mechanism, then
inspected miscategorized influential samples can logically be
determined to be either (a) mislabeled samples which sig-
nificantly impact the model or (b) key model deficiencies
(which could spur feature development, possibly protecting
against adversarial attack). Moreover, we find that, at least
on our dataset, influential samples are especially likely to be
mislabeled. By investigating highly influential samples which
were nominally miscategorized by a malware classifier, we
discover previously unidentified malware samples.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
For the dataset, we assume that X ∈ Rn×p is a dataset of
n samples and p predictors, and that y ∈ Rn is a vector of
outcomes.
For multivariate linear regression, we assume that y =
Xβ + , where  ∼ Nn(0, σ2I). The fitted values of
the response variable are given by ŷ = Xβ̂, where the
ordinary least squares solution for the parameter is β̂ =
(XTX)−1XTy. The vector of residuals is given by r̂ =
y − ŷ. (More generally, in generalized linear regression, the
vector of residuals is given by r̂ = y−Ê[y|X], where Ê[y|X]
is the expected value of the response variable, according to
the model, given the predictors.) The value of the regression
weights with the ith sample deleted from the dataset is denoted
by β̂(i). Whether xi represents the ith row or ith column of
X should be clear from context; without a transpose symbol,
xi is oriented as a matrix with a single column. The hat
notation refers to a population parameter that is estimated from
a dataset.
For random projections, we let Ω ∈ Rp×k be a random pro-
jection matrix, where k is the target or reduced dimensionality
for the feature space. We let Y ∈ Rn×k : Y = XΩ be the
randomly projected dataset.
B. Types of Errors
In this section, we introduce nomenclature to differentiate
possible errors in the presence of label noise. When labels are
uncertain, errors can occur either during the modeling process
(which relates labels, y, to features, X) or during the labeling
process (which assigns labels, y, to samples).
We refer to errors in the modeling process (i.e., where
the model’s prediction does not match the nominal la-
bel) as modeling errors or nominal errors. In particular,
a nominal Type 1 error (or nominal false positive) is the
event {model predicts bad and provided label is good}, and
nominal model Type 2 error (nominal miss) is the event
{model predicts good and provided label is bad}. Note that
nominal modeling miscategorizations can happen at the level
of training or testing.
We refer to errors in the labeling mechanism (i.e.,
where the nominal label does not match the actual
ground truth) as labeling errors. In particular, a la-
beling Type 1 error (labeling false positive) is the
event {sample labeled as bad and sample is actually good},
and labeling Type II error (labeling miss) is the event
{sample is labeled as good and sample is actually bad}.
The model produces an actual miscategorization (i.e., the
model’s prediction does not match the actual label) when either
a modeling error or a labeling error occurs – but not both. The
distinctions between these types of errors will be particularly
important in Section V-D2.
III. BACKGROUND
A. Leverage
1) Construction: The concept of influence depends, in part,
on the concept of leverage [3]. Leverage is a particularly useful
quantity for describing unusual samples, reflecting the degree
to which a sample lies in extreme locations of feature space.
Leverage scores are computed from the hat matrix, given
by
H = X(XTX)−1XT (1)
The hat matrix is an orthogonal projection matrix which
projects vectors onto the column space of X . For example, in
linear regression, the hat matrix H maps the observed values
y onto the fitted values ŷ (and so it “puts the hat on" y).
The leverage for the ith sample is given by hi, the ith
diagonal of the hat matrix:
hi = x
T
i (X
TX)−1xi (2)
Through the idempotency and symmetry of the hat matrix,
H , it is possible to derive the bound 0 ≤ hi ≤ 1.
2) Interpretation: We can explain how leverage quantifies
whether a sample lies in “extreme locations of feature space"
by relating the statistic to the dataset’s principal components.
Let Xc represent the centered dataset and xci represent the
ith sample in a centered dataset (i.e. the mean is subtracted
off of all features). Let the dataset Xc be full rank, and let
xpcai,1 , . . . ,x
pca
i,P represent the P principal components for x
c
i ,
listed in order of non-decreasing eigenvalues λ21 ≥ ... ≥ λ2P .
Using the singular value decomposition for Xc and the fact
that the principal directions are the right singular vectors, it is
easy to show that:
hi =
P∑
p=1
(
xpcai,p
λp
)2
In fact, letting θip represent the angle between the ith sample
and pth principal component in feature space Rp, we obtain:
hi = ||xci ||22
P∑
p=1
(
cos(θip)
λp
)2
(3)
Equation 3 nicely reveals that leverage values are large if
(1) the sample is far from the bulk of the other samples
in feature space, and (2) a substantial part of its magnitude
lies along non-dominant principal components. For a visual
representation of this analysis, see Figure 1.
3) Alternative Viewpoint: For a related viewpoint on lever-
age, consider an alternative construction: hi/(1−hi). Although
in Section III-A1, the term leverage referred simply to the
numerator, hi, the two terms are monotonically related. Thus,
both formulations of leverage provide an identical ordering
of samples. To interpret this variant, consider that using the
idempotency of H as an orthogonal projection, we can obtain
formulas for the variance of the fitted values and residuals in
the case of linear regression:
V ar(ŷ) = X(XTX)−1XTσ2 = Hσ2 (4)
V ar(r̂) =
(
I −X(XTX)−1XT
)
σ2 = (I −H)σ2 (5)
Based on these formulas, we obtain
hi
(1− hi) =
V ar(ŷi)
V ar(r̂i)
For a simple illustration, Figure 2 captures how a simple linear
regression model tends to provide excellent fits to extreme
points in predictor space, tracking them as they move around.
As a result, these extreme points have small variance for the
residuals, V ar(r̂i), relative to the variance for the fitted values,
V ar(ŷi). Thus, outlying samples are called high “leverage"
because the fitted regression model is particularly sensitive to
them.
B. Cook’s Distance: A measure of influence
1) Construction: Cook’s distance, ci, was developed for re-
gression models in order to summarize the influence of the ith
sample on the model fit [2]. Cook’s distance accomplishes this
through case deletion; i.e., by comparing the fitted regression
weights if all samples are fit, versus if all but the ith sample
are fit. This comparison is (β̂(i)− β̂). If we wanted to reduce
this to a single scalar summary statistic, we could employ the
Euclidean inner product to measure the (squared) magnitude
of the overall displacement:
(β̂(i) − β̂)T (β̂(i) − β̂) (6)
Cook’s distance is similar in spirit, but employs a more general
inner product; in particular, it satisfies
ci ∝ (β̂(i) − β̂)T Cov(β̂)−1 (β̂(i) − β̂) (7)
where Cov(β̂) is the covariance matrix of the fitted regression
weights.
To understand the derivation, recall that the estimator β̂ is
asympotically distributed as a multivariate normal distribution:
β̂
•∼ N(β, Cov(β̂)) (8)
This implies, since Cov(β) = (XTX)−1σ2, and using
standard facts about multivariate normals, that
(β̂ − β)T X
TX
σ2
(β̂ − β) •∼ χ2p (9)
Now we switch our point of view, making substitutions3
about what is known, β ← β̂, and what is being estimated,
β̂ ← β̂(i). Throwing away the constant denominator, which
is not relevant for making comparisons across samples, we
obtain:
ci = (β̂(i) − β̂)T XTX (β̂(i) − β̂) (10)
which satisfies Equation 7.
Thus, Cook’s distance effectively imposes the model
β̂(i) ∼ N
(
β̂, Cov(β̂)
)
(11)
More precisely, Cook’s distance is proportional to the log
kernel of the multivariate normal density N
(
β̂, Cov(β̂)
)
evaluated at the perturbed regression weights, β̂(i).
2) Interpretation: In a sense, this distributional assumption
for β̂(i) is duplicitous. After the substitutions made in Sec-
tion III-B1, the probability distribution assigned to β̂(i) is no
longer correct. As just one example, the frequentist derivation
of the quantity in Equation 9 assumes predictor variables X
are fixed (rather than random variables), but case deletion
altersX . However, Cook constructed his ci statistic not for the
purpose of hypothesis testing or creating confidence intervals
using β̂(i), but as a sheer measure of distance between
the original and perturbed regression weights. As seen by
Equation 11, Cook’s Distance monotonically increases as the
3In Cook’s original formulation [2], these substitutions were made only
after estimating the unknown variance, σ2, with the sample variance, s2,
obtaining a ratio of independent chi-squared random variables divided by
their respective degrees of freedom, and thereby deriving an F-statistic:
(β̂ − β)T XTX (β̂ − β)
ps2
•∼ F (p, n − p). However, as mentioned, the
constant denominator is not relevant for making comparisons across samples;
thus, it has become more common (see, e.g. [12], [8]) to use the form in
Equation 10.
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Fig. 1: A principal components view of leverage. The first and second principal components are plotted as lines colored blue and red,
respectively. The red and blue points lie about equally far from the mean of the dataset (about (0,0)), and they all have unusually large
leverage. However, the red data points have much larger leverage than the blue data points. This is because they primarily lie along a
non-dominant principal component.
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Fig. 2: A high leverage point in the context of simple linear
regression. The point on the upper right of the plot has very high
leverage. If the point were pushed downward, the entire regression
line would shift dramatically.
likelihood of observing β̂(i) under the model of Equation 11
decreases. In other words, a sample is influential if the model
fit without that sample has regression weights that look unusual
based on knowledge obtained from the model fit with that
sample. In particular, to determine what counts as an “unusual"
vector of regression weights, Cook’s distance incorporates
information about the covariance structure of β̂, yielding a
substantial advantage over the simpler Euclidean inner product
from Equation 6. This produces nice properties; for example,
(a) Individually speaking, some features have inherently more
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Fig. 3: Illustration of Cook’s Distances. If case deletion produces a
new regression vector β̂(i) which is not likely given the distributional
assumption β̂(i) ∼ N
(
β̂, Cov(β̂)
)
, then the sample has a large
Cook’s distance.
uncertain (i.e., higher variance) regression weights than others.
Thus, if a sample perturbs these high variance regression
weights, it would be considered less influential than a sample
which perturbs lower variance regression weights. (b) Collec-
tively speaking, holding magnitude of change constant, certain
distributions of variation across multiple regression weights
are more expected (i.e., more likely) than others. An influential
sample perturbs the regression weights in unlikely directions.
Figure 3 provides a toy example illustrating these properties,
which hold because Cook’s Distance depends upon the esti-
mated covariance structure of the regression weights. For the
purposes of the toy example, we construct a bivariate feature
space where the empirical covariance matrix for the regression
weights is preset to Cov(β̂) :=
[
.3 .1
.1 .1
]
. We see here that the
β̂(i)’s on the elliptical isocontours of the estimated probability
distribution of Equation 8 have equivalent Cook’s distances.
In other words, two samples which cause equally-sized model
displacements but in different directions will generally not be
considered, by Cook’s metric, equally influential. The main
point is that Cook’s distance determines a sample’s influence
not simply by measuring the size of its perturbation on the
regression weights, but also by evaluating the direction of
perturbation. In sum, influential samples cause not merely
large – but also strange – perturbations of regression weights.
3) Computational Form: Since fitting case deletions re-
quires an iterative procedure, computing β̂(i) for each sample
would be difficult. This is especially true in the large-scale
case and with a regularized generalized linear model such as
the logistic lasso; indeed, in the example we consider here,
it would require fitting over 2 million large-sample high-
dimensional models, each one of which might take on the
order of an hour. However, Cook (1977,1979) developed a
way to estimate the quantity in Equation 10 directly from the
Hat matrix. In particular, Cook [2] showed that
β̂ − β̂(i) =
(XTX)−1xi
(1− hi) (yi − ŷi) (12)
Using this equation, we can determine (β̂−β̂(i)), the change
in regression weights caused by case deletion, as a function
of already known quantities (meaning that it would not be
necessary to rerun the regression). Substituting this trick into
the definition for Cook’s Distance given in Equation 10, we
obtain a computational formula for Cook’s Distance:
ci = r̂2i
hi
(1− hi) (13)
4) Decomposition: The computational form for Cook’s dis-
tance (Equation 13) enables a decomposition of influence into
component concepts. Note that the first term in the product,
r̂2i , quantifies the extent to which the sample is “discrepant."
A sample is discrepant (or a regression outlier) if it has an
unusual yi observation given its xi predictors and the fitted
model. The second term in the product,
hi
(1− hi) , describes
whether the sample has “leverage." In Section III-A, we noted
that a sample has high leverage if it has an extreme value
of the vector xi. With these definitions in mind, we can
immediately see, embedded within the computational form
of Cook’s Distance (Equation 13), a common moniker for
conceptualizing influence:
Influence = discrepancy× leverage
C. Generalized Cook’s Distance: Extending Influence to Gen-
eralized Linear Models (GLMs)
1) Construction: Pregibon [12] developed an approxima-
tion for Cook’s distance in the case of generalized linear mod-
els (which can handle observations whose error distributions
are not normal, but rather binomial, Poisson, beta, etc.). To
see how, consider that the so-called “normal equations” used
to solve for β̂, XT r̂ = 0, are nonlinear in β̂, and so iterative
methods are required to solve them. A common approach is to
apply Newton-Raphson technique, which, after some algebra,
leads to the iterative expression
β̂
t+1
= (XTV tX)−1XTV tzt (14)
where V t = diag
(
p̂ti(1 − p̂ti)
)
for logistic regression (and
where the matrix can be similarly derived from the exponential
family representation of other probability distributions from
the set of generalized linear models) and where
zt = Xβ̂
t
+ (V t)−1r̂t (15)
The iterative procedure in Equation 14 is known as iterative
re-weighted least squares (IRLS). In particular, upon conver-
gence (and so where we have obtained V := limt→∞ V t), the
maximum likelihood estimator for β can then be expressed as
the solution of a weighted least squares problem:
β̂ = (XTV X)−1XTV z (16)
In other words, the same regression weights would be obtained
if we had performed a simple linear regression of psuedo-
observations V 1/2z on psuedo-predictors V 1/2X .
Pursuing this observation, Pregibon [12] obtained general-
ized regression diagnotics. In particular, we can let t go to
infinity in Equation 15 , premultiply the result by V 1/2, and
apply the following substitutions:
X ←X∗ = V 1/2X (17)
y ← y∗ = V 1/2z
r̂ ← r̂∗ = V −1/2 r̂
Using these substitutions, we can transform the original pre-
dictors, observations, and residuals into their psuedo-versions,
and thereby obtain the following linearized representation
(available only after convergence) of the generalized linear
model:
y∗ = X∗β̂ + r̂∗ (18)
This representation renders all the model diagnostics from
linear regression available to generalized linear regressions.
For instance, the hat matrix becomes:
H∗ = X∗(X∗TX∗)−1X∗T (19)
= V 1/2X(XTV X)−1XTV 1/2
And the generalized version of Cook’s distance becomes:
ci = (r̂i
∗)2
h∗i
(1− h∗i )
(20)
2) Computing V , the IRLS weight matrix for Generalized
Cook’s Distance: Generalized linear models (normal, logistic,
multinomial, Poisson, beta, etc. regressions) model response
variables yi through probability distributions from the “expo-
nential family." These distributions have probability densities
for observations that are dependent upon location and scaling
parameters, θ and φ, respectively, and can be expressed in the
following form (for a single observation, yi):
f(yi; θ, φ) = exp
{
yiθi − b(θi)
a(φ)
+ c(yi, θ)
}
where typically a(φ) = φ/ρi.
The vector of predictor variables for a given sample, xi, are
incorporated by modeling the expected value of the response,
EYi := µi, as a function of the so-called “linear predictor"
ηi = x
T
i βˆ through a link function, g(·), via µi = g−1(ηi).
(For example, in logistic regression, g(·) is the logit function).
For any generalized linear model, we can express the IRLS
weight matrix, V ∈ Rn×n = diag(vi), through the following
relation:
vi =
ρi
b′′(θi)
(
∂ηi
∂µi
)2 (21)
For instance, for logistic regression, vi = p̂i(1 − p̂i), and
for linear regression, vi = 1.
IV. “INFLUENCE SKETCHING": MEASURING INFLUENCE
IN LARGE SCALE REGRESSIONS
A. Scalability issues with the classical method
For large scale regressions, the computation of the hat
matrix is infeasible. In Equation 1, we see that the hat matrix
requires computation of (XTX)−1, which can be infeasible
for high dimensional datasets with many samples. Thus, it
is not immediately clear how to identify unusually influential
samples in this setting.
B. Random Projections
Randomized algorithms, such as random projections [11],
have become a widely used approach for handling very large
matrix problems. Given a n×p matrix X , which we interpret
as n samples in p dimensional-space, a random projection
involves post-multiplying X by a p × k random projection
matrix Ω. The resulting randomly projected dataset, Y = XΩ
has only k dimensions instead of the original p dimensions,
thereby speeding up computations dramatically. The Johnson-
Lindenstrauss (JL) embedding theorem [4] can be applied to
show that this procedure approximately preserves pairwise
distances between the n samples so long as k is chosen on
the order of log n.
There are a number of ways to construct such a matrix.
For instance, a Gaussian random projection has entries which
are i.i.d. Gaussian N(0, 1) random variables. A very sparse
random projection involves constructing Ω with entries in
{−1, 0, 1} with probabilities { 1
2
√
p
, 1 − 1√
p
,
1
2
√
p
}. This
construction is especially useful for very large problems, as
it produces a
√
p-fold speedup with little loss in accuracy [7].
Of crucial interest to us here is that randomly projected
datasets have approximately the same column space (or
“range") as the original dataset, so long as k is chosen large
enough to at least approximate the effective dimensionality,
or numerical rank, of the dataset [11], [6]. The intuition is
as follows: if Ωi is the ith column of Ω, then XΩi will
obviously lie in the range of X . But by the random sampling,
the columns Ωi are very likely to be linearly independent
(although possibly poorly conditioned), and thus to have a
k-dimensional range. We summarize this fact as CX ≈ CY ,
and will use it in Section IV-D to justify the use of random
projections in an algorithm for measuring the influence of
samples in large-scale regressions.
C. Proposed Solution
In Algorithm 1 (“Influence Sketching"), we describe how
to calculate approximate sample influence scores for large-
scale regressions from the GLM family. The algorithm em-
beds random projections inside the hat matrix by randomly
projecting the pseudo-predictors, X∗ = XV 1/2, defined in
Section III-C1. We define the randomly projected psuedo-
predictors as Y ∗ = X∗Ω = V 1/2XΩ, where Ω is a random
projection matrix. In comparison to the generalized hat matrix
of Equation 19, which we now more explicitly denote as H∗X ,
the generalized hat matrix for large-scale regressions is:
H∗Y = V
1/2Y (Y TV Y )−1Y TV 1/2 (22)
= V 1/2XΩ(ΩTXTV XΩ)−1ΩTXTV 1/2
The algorithm can find influential samples from large-
scale regressions of various types from the GLM family by
appropriate choice of the matrix V ; for instance, for linear
regression we have V = In, the identity matrix, and for
logistic regression we have V = diag(p̂i(1− p̂i)), where p̂i is
the fitted probability that the sample takes on a response value
of 1. Note that for logistic regression, the expression Ê[y|X]
in the residual formula simply evaluates to p̂, the vector of
fitted probabilities that the samples have binary responses of
1 given their predictor variables.
D. Justification
The intuition behind the “influence sketching" algorithm is
as follows: recall that the role of the hat matrix, H , is to
project responses y onto the column space of X . (The same
argument holds for the generalized hat matrix, H∗, which
projects pseudo-responses y∗ onto the column space of the
pseudo-predictors,X∗.) Since random projections preserve the
column space of the dataset, it should be possible to embed
random projections inside the construction of the hat matrix
to obtain approximate sample influence scores.
In detail, consider that the hat matrix H∗X :=
X∗(X∗TX∗)−1X∗T is a projection matrix which projects
vectors onto the column space of X∗. That is, if we denote
Algorithm 1 (Influence Sketching): Calculating sample in-
fluence for large scale regressions
Data A dataset X ∈ Rn×p, a random projection matrix
Ω ∈ Rp×k, and a regression model chosen from the family
of generalized linear models.
Result A vector c ∈ Rn quantifying the influence of each
sample on the model fit.
1: From the regression model, obtain the fitted observations
Ê[y|X] and the converged IRLS (iteratively reweighted
least squares) diagonal weight matrix, V ∈ Rn×n, where
the latter can be constructed using a lookup table or the
relationship in Equation 21.
2: Compute the re-weighted residuals r̂∗ = V −1/2(y −
Ê[y|X])
3: Form re-weighted randomly projected data: Z ∈ Rn×k :
Z = V 1/2Y , where Y = XΩ is the original dataset
randomly projected to k dimensions.
4: Form the inverse-covariance matrix of the re-weighted
randomly projected data : W ∈ Rk×k : W = (ZTZ)−1
5: Get the leverage values as the diagonal elements of the
generalized hat matrix, h∗i ∈ R : h∗i = zTi Wzi
6: Compute the approximate influence (or generalized
Cook’s distance) scores as ci = (r̂∗i)2
h∗i
(1− h∗i )
the column space of X∗ by CX∗ , and the Eulidean projection
onto C by ΠC , then we have ΠC = X∗(X∗TX∗)−1X∗T , in
the sense that for any vector v ∈ Rn, we have:
ΠCX∗ (v) := argminx∈CX∗ ||x− v||2
= X∗(X∗TX∗)−1X∗Tv = H∗Xv
Now by the Hilbert Space Projection Theorem, and since
Rn is a Hilbert Space, we have
a projection onto any closed subspace of Rn
produces a unique element (23)
That is, the image of the transformation will not be affected
by redescriptions of the set C. Thus, if two matrices Y ∗ and
X∗ have identical column spaces, then their hat matrices are
equal, because
H∗Y = Y
∗(Y ∗TY ∗)−1Y ∗T
= ΠCY ∗
(23)
= ΠCX∗
= X∗(X∗TX∗)−1X∗T = H∗X
Now, as discussed in Section IV-B, from random projection
theory, we know that CX∗ ≈ CY ∗ (That is, if Ω ∈ Rp×k is
a random projection matrix, then the column space of Y ∗ ∈
Rn×k : Y ∗ = X∗Ω is approximately equal to the column
space of X∗, so long as k is sufficiently large). Thus, so long
as k is sufficiently large, H∗Y ≈H∗X .
E. Computational complexity
We now investigate the computational complexity of Algo-
rithm 1, assuming the relatively unlikely worst case scenario
that the dataset and random projection matrices are dense.
In practice, however, large scale data-sets are sparse, and the
random projection can be made sparse as well, dramatically
improving algorithmic performance. The formation of the
proxy dataset in Step 3 is O(npk). This is the cost of
the matrix multiplications (recalling that the V 1/2 matrix is
diagonal). The formation of the inverse covariance matrix of
the proxy dataset in Step 4 is O(nk2 + k3). This is the cost
of another matrix multiplication followed by a matrix inverse.
Finally, the computation of the leverage in Step 5 is O(nk2)
considered as a for loop over matrix multiplications.
Thus, the algorithm has (worst-case) complexity O(npk +
nk2 +k3). We can re-express this in terms of n and p only by
considering that, by the (JL) embedding lemma [1], distances
between samples can be well-preserved to a particular pre-
specified error tolerance when k increases on the order of
log(n). Since for most applications log3(n) < min{p, n},
the algorithm has an approximate worst-case complexity of
O(np log(n)).
F. Large Scale Regularized GLMs
Strictly speaking, the argument above does not apply in a
straightforward manner to large scale regularized GLMs, such
as lasso logistic regression. The argument so far depends upon
the fact that GLMs can be solved by IRLS (and therefore re-
represented, after convergence, as a linear regression with re-
defined predictors and responses). However, in this setting, the
logistic lasso [10] is solved by incorporating a least angle re-
gression (LARS) algorithm at each step of the IRLS algorithm
(which amounts to solving a linear lasso, rather than a linear
regression, at each iteration). Whether or not the arguments
above, which justify influence sketching, would extend to
logistic lasso is unclear, as are the appropriate adjustments
(if any) to the influence sketching algorithm to handle the
case of regularization. We leave this as a direction for future
research. For now, we just imagine that the regression weights
produced by a regularized regression were produced by an
unregularized regression, even though this approach could
theoretically produce grave distortions in assessing influence,
since there would be inappropriate estimates for the quantity
Cov(β̂) which lies at the heart of Cook’s Distance (see
Section III-B1).
V. EXPERIMENT
A. Motivation
In the experiment, we address two primary questions:
1) Can influence sketching help to prioritize samples for hu-
man expert attention? For example, a priority queue could
be constructed on nominal model miscategorizations to
search for influential mislabeled samples, whose labels
could be flipped [5]. For priority queuing, we would like
three conditions to hold:
a) The rare event condition refers to the fact that the dis-
tribution of influence sketch scores should be heavily
right-skewed, meaning that a relatively small number
of samples accounts for a relatively large amount of
influence on the fitted model.
b) Validity refers to the fact that the influence sketching
algorithm, despite using randomization, should track
true (non-approximated) influence scores. If so, the
samples deemed influential by the influence sketching
algorithm should indeed have disproportionately large
influence on the fitted regression betas, and omitting
such samples from training (but not testing) should
reduce predictive accuracy.
c) Reliability refers to the fact that the ranking of samples
by influence should not vary much from random pro-
jection matrix to random projection matrix (assuming
sufficiently large choice of latent dimensonality, k.)
2) Are samples with large influence sketch scores partic-
ularly likely to be mislabeled? In the framing of the
previous question, the priority queue simply focuses the
search for mislabeled samples to the candidates which
matter most to the model. In this way, the priority queue
would be valuable even if the proportion of miscatego-
rized samples which are mislabeled does not covary with
influence scores. However, when miscategorized samples
are also influential, they may in fact be particularly likely
to be mislabeled, in which case prioritizing by influence
additionally enhances the probability of discovering la-
beling errors. The argument for this hypothesis, following
the moniker that influence = discrepancy × leverage (see
Section III-B4), is that such samples are not only mis-
categorized, but also have large model residuals, and are
located in strange regions of feature space (at least with
regards to the pseudo-dataset X∗). Both conditions are
suggestive of label noise: large model residuals suggest
that model may be struggling to fit an incorrect label, and
high leverage (reflecting that the sample is located in an
usual location of feature space) suggests that the labeling
mechanism may be particularly error-prone (e.g., in the
case of cybersecurity, it’s possible that signature-based
detection would struggle to accurate identify such pieces
of malware).
B. Data
Training data are Ntrain=2,342,274 Portable Executable (PE)
files.4 These files were labeled as either “clean” or “malicious”
by a automatic labeling algorithm based on signature-based de-
tection (see, e.g. [9]). Using this method, 1,374,226 (58.67%)
of the files were determined to be malicious. The remainder
of the files were determined to be clean. The "malware"
category contained different types of malicious software (e.g.,
computer viruses, Trojan horses, spyware, ransomware, and
adware). An additional Ntest=562,066 files (62.35% malware)
4The Portable Executable (PE) file format is the standard executable file
format used in Windows and Windows-like operating systems.
were obtained for the test set. From each portable executable
file, we extracted P = 98, 450 features previously determined
to be relevant to whether a file was malicious or not. The
features were sparse, and mixed continuous and binary. The
density level was approximately .0224. These features were
also used in [14].
Due to the presence of label noise, we obtained software
vendor reputational scores for a subset (150, 751, 15.57%) of
the clean samples from the training set. Clean samples were
analyzed because the labels were obtained by an algorithm
based on signature-based detection, which is known to have
low false positive but high miss rates (see, e.g. [9]). Of these
samples, 47,193 (31.31%) were rated as coming from “highly
trusted" sources (such as Microsoft). When a nominally good
sample was developed by a highly trusted source, we say that
it has a highly trusted label.
C. Methods
To create the influence sketches, we chose a very sparse
random projection matrix (see Section IV-B). This type of pro-
jection matrix was chosen to partially preserve the sparsity in
our dataset and to speed computation time. As recommended
by [7], the density of the random projection matrix was set
to 1/
√
P ≈ .003. We set K = 5000 based on the results
of [14]. Obtaining influence scores for all 2.3 million samples
took about an hour and a half using non-optimized scripts
written in the Julia programming language and executed on a
single r3.8x instance (with 32 workers for parallel processing)
in Amazon’s EC2 system.
To validate the technique, we applied two types of re-
gression models for binary classification: a logistic regres-
sion and lasso logistic regression (i.e. L1-regularized logistic
regression). Because constructing the optimal lasso logistic
regression model was not directly relevant to the goals of this
paper, the lasso logistic regression was made parameter free
by constructing the cost function such that equal weight was
placed on the negative log likelihood and the L1-regularization
term. We fit each type of regression model to the dataset,
and then we performed an “ablation experiment" where we
deleted fixed numbers of samples from the training set. These
samples were either influential samples or randomly selected
samples. We then retrained the regression models so that
we could observe the effect on predictive performance on
the hold-out test set. The number of files to ablate, Nablate,
was set to: (a) 23, (b) 23,000, (c) 115,000, and (d) 230,000,
constituting approximately .001%, 1%, 5%, and 10% of the
training corpus, respectively. We compared the effect on the
model of ablating the Nablate most influential samples, vs.
Nablate randomly selected files.
For the model training error analysis, performed on the full
training set, the influential sample set was defined as the top
23,000 (≈ 1%) of influential samples. For the label trust-
worthiness analysis of the 150,751 nominally good samples
for which label trustworthiness judgments were available, the
“very high" influence group was defined as the .1% most
influential samples (i.e. ranks 1-151), the “high" influence
Fig. 4: Distribution of Influence Sketch Scores. The distribution of
influence sketch scores is heavily right-skewed.
group as the next .1% most influential such samples (i.e. ranks
152-253), and the “not high" influence group as the remaining
samples.
D. Results and Discussion
1) Can influence sketching help to prioritize samples for
human expert attention?: We begin by addressing the rare
event condition for influence sketching. The distribution of
influence sketch scores for the full training set is shown
in Figure 4. The distribution of influence for these portable
executable files is heavily right-skewed, suggesting that a
relatively small percentage of samples is much more influ-
ential than the other samples. For example, 6.3% of the total
influence (the sum of the influence scores) were achieved by
a mere 0.1% of the samples. This suggests that we can obtain
an asymmetrically large payoff from investment by restricting
any manual analysis to influential samples.
Next, we address the validity of the influence sketching
algorithm. Samples with large influence sketch scores are rare,
but is the influence sketching algorithm truly finding influ-
ential samples, despite the approximations from the random
projection matrix? We find that the displacement in the beta
vector, measured in terms of the L1-norm (or sum of the
absolute values of its elements) is substantially larger when
influential samples are removed than when random samples
are removed. For instance, for the logistic lasso, the norm
||∆β̂||1 when ablating random vs. influential samples was
(4486.07 vs. 4646.35) for ablations of size 23, (4,979.38
vs. 30,504.26) for ablations of size 23,000, and (17,048.51
vs 79,026.27) for ablations of size 230,000. Although, as
discussed in Section III-B2, displacements in the magnitude
of β̂ is only part of what influence measures (directionality
matters as well), this finding corroborates the notion that
influence sketching is finding influential samples.
To further emphasize this point, we ask: do the samples
flagged as influential by the influence sketching algorithm
actually impact the model’s downstream predictive perfor-
mance on a hold-out test set? A skeptic might argue, based
on the moniker that influence = leverage × discrepancy, that
influential samples could conceivably hugely impact the re-
gression betas without having a large impact on the predictive
performance. The argument in this case would be that the
regression betas might shift dramatically in order to handle the
samples in extreme locations of feature space (equivalent to
dragging the far-right point, and therefore the fitted regression
line, downward in Figure 5), but that this large shift in
regression weights would have a relatively minor influence
on the fitted or predicted values for most samples, which lie
in more populated regions of feature space (indeed, even if the
regression line were dragged down to be horizontal, the fitted
values for the large cloud of points in Figure 5 would remain
about the same).
In contrast to this logic, we find that the influential samples
identified by the influence sketching algorithm are exception-
ally impactful on a large-scale regression model’s predictive
performance. Figure 5 shows results of the ablating experi-
ment, where we find that removing influential samples from
the training set substantially deteriorates model predictive per-
formance on an unaltered hold-out test set. The figure shows
that removing up to 10% of samples from the training corpus,
so long as they are selected randomly, has no discernible effect
on predictive performance. For example, the full logistic lasso
model with all samples obtains 99.47% predictive accuracy,
whereas randomly deleting approximately 10% of the training
samples reduces accuracy only slightly to 99.45%. In contrast,
deleting the same number of influential samples (the far right
tail of Figure 4) from training reduces predictive accuracy all
the way down to 90.24%. Clearly, the model is disproportion-
ately strongly affected by influential samples, which can be a
problem if there are systematic labeling errors in the sample
set.5 Indeed, in Section V-D2, we demonstrate that influential
samples are, in fact, particularly likely to be mislabeled.
However, the main point here is simply about the validity
of influence sketching algorithm: manipulating the training
set by removing samples with high influence sketch scores
significantly altered the training distribution with respect to
model learning, but the same did not occur when removing
random samples. Thus, the influence sketching algorithm is
indeed finding influential samples.
Finally, we address the reliability of the influence sketching
algorithm. We ran the influence sketching algorithm twice,
with two independently sampled random projection matrices
of the type described in Section V-C. Despite the approximate
nature of influence sketching due to the random projection,
we obtain very similar influence scores (and nearly identical
ranking of samples according to influence), as expected by the
justification for influence sketching provided in Section IV-D.
Indeed, the correlation between influence sketch scores across
5We note that if systematic labeling errors are uniformly distributed across
training and test sets, as they should be by random assignment, then removing
mislabeled samples from the training set (or relabeling them), without anal-
ogously adjusting the test set, may nominally deteriorate model performance,
while improving actual model performance with regards to accurate labels.
However, we do not believe that all influential samples are mislabeled.
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Fig. 6: Reliability of influence sketch scores across two runs.
runs was very high (r=.9995). In Figure 6, we display a
smoothed color density representation of a scatterplot, ob-
tained through a kernel density estimate, generated by the
smoothScatter function in the R programming language.
The density gradient ranges from white (low density) to red
(high density), and the 500 largest points are plotted in black.
2) Are samples with large influence sketch scores par-
ticularly likely to be mislabeled?: In Figure 7 (top left),
we show the distribution of nominal model training errors6
for influential vs. non-influential samples. We note first that
6The discussion in this section relies on the nomenclature of Section II-B.
nominal training accuracy is lower for influential samples
(99.41%) than non-influential samples (99.81%), suggesting
that the model struggles more when fitting the influential sam-
ples. Moreover, whereas the model is well-calibrated overall
(for non-influential samples, the percentage of nominal false
positives, 0.098%, and nominal misses, 0.076%, is nearly
equal), the model shifts dramatically towards committing false
positives on the influential samples (for influential samples,
the percentage of nominal false positives is 0.58%, whereas
the model actually makes no nominal misses.) This finding
is extremely interesting with regards to detecting mislabeled
files. Our belief about signature-based detection, which is
commonplace (see, e.g. [9]), is that if a file is indicted, it is
likely actually malicious; however, many malicious files do not
get caught by signature-based detection, especially initially,
because it takes time to identify suspect files and to write
signatures for them. In other words, the labeling mechanism
can be assumed to have a high miss and a low false positive
rate. This would in turn cause the modeling process to have
a high nominal false positive and low nominal miss rate,
precisely the pattern observed with the influential samples.
This result suggests that influential miscategorized samples
may be especially likely to be mislabeled.
To further pursue the relationship between influence and
mislabeling, as discussed in Section V-B, label trustworthi-
ness judgments were obtained (as a proxy for mislabeling
probabilities) for a subset of nominally good samples in the
training set. In Figure 7 (bottom left), we see that samples
whose nominal good labels are not highly trusted have higher
influence scores. In Figure 7 (top right), we see that the
percentage of nominally good samples with highly trusted
labels drops, in a statistically significant way, for sets of
samples with high levels of influence. The 95% confidence
intervals for the true prevalence of highly trusted labels is
31.34%± 2.3% for the non-influential group, 21.05%± 6.6%
for the high influence group, and 5.29% ± 3.6% for the
very high influence group. In Figure 7 (bottom right), we
show that influence scores are more discriminating of label
mistrust than residual scores (which are more straightforward
to calculate). The blue points represent the mean Pearson
squared residuals and the red points represent influence sketch
scores, where both metrics have been rescaled for the purposes
of visualization. The plot reveals that influence scores are more
discriminating than residual scores – the signal to noise ratio
is substantially higher for the influence sketch scores than for
the residuals.
To more directly investigate whether influence sketching can
help point towards mislabeled samples, we manually analyze
the 10 most influential nominal mistakes by the model (here,
all nominal false positives) to determine an actual ground
truth for these samples. Our manual analysis revealed that,
despite the nominal labels of good, 8/10 of these samples
indeed had “dark grey" to “black" properties. A number of
these samples appeared to represent newly discovered malware
variants (undetected by the labeling mechanism). For example,
the particular version of the video editing tool infected with
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estimating means. See Section V-D2 for more detail.
Parasitic Ramnit passed scans by ESET, Microsoft, Sophos,
and Trend.
VI. WHY FIND INFLUENTIAL SAMPLES
Our analysis reveals some uses for the identification of
influential samples in large-scale regressions. In particular, we
have focused on manually analyzing influential samples which
were nominally miscategorized by the model.
1) The influential nominally miscategorized, but actually
correctly categorized, samples can be an excellent place
to find mislabeled samples. As manual analysis is expen-
sive, focus should be placed on critical samples with the
largest influence on the model’s fitted weights and down-
stream predictions. Thus, compared to traditional label
cleansing approaches which recommend investigating all
miscategorized samples, the influential miscategorizations
provide the largest “bang for your buck." In this case, by
investigating the nominal false positives from the top 1%
most influential files, we would reduce our manual labors
from investigating 1,780 false positives to only 133 false
positives – an over 13-fold reduction in labor efforts –
and we would know that continuing further would yield
diminishing returns on our efforts. Moreover, the results
in Section V-D2 suggest that nominal miscategorizations,
when influential, are in fact particularly likely to be
mislabeled.
2) The influential nominally miscategorized, and actually
miscategorized, samples can point to key model vulnera-
bilities and spur ideas for improving the regression model,
e.g. through novel feature generation. Two samples – the
Pharos Popup client and CryptDrive – were labeled by the
regression model as bad, despite “good" training labels
and the fact that these samples were actually legitimate
software. Do these samples perhaps have “confusing"
combinations of features? Might it be helpful to add new
features to help more generally clarify the status of printer
drivers or installers for data encryption software? We note
that, whereas in our particular dataset, influential samples
were all nominal false positives, in the general case, a
dataset would yield influential nominal misses. Whenever
a manual analysis determines that these influential nom-
inal misses are actual misses, then influence sketching
would point towards key model vulnerabilities that could
be exploited by an adversarial attacker.
VII. CONCLUSION
We show that the influence sketching algorithm, which
embeds random projections into the construction of a gen-
eralized Cook’s distance score, can successfully flag samples
that are especially impactful on the performance of large-scale
regressions. This finding suggests that influence sketching
can be useful for constructing priority queues for manual
analysis by experts. Moreover, further statistical analysis and
the case study suggest that influential apparent model mis-
categorizations can point towards mislabeled samples, which,
in the cybersecurity domain, can lead to undiscovered mal-
ware. Finally, in other contexts (where influential misses are
prevalent), influence sketching may highlight critical model
vulnerabilities open to exploitation by an adversary. Future
research should further explore this connection between influ-
ence sketching and adversarial attacks, as well as the potential
for generalizing influence sketching to more general models
(e.g., neural networks).
APPENDIX
As a case study, we manually analyze the 10 most influ-
ential nominal model miscategorizations (all nominal false
positives). Despite the “good" training labels, 8/10 samples
had “dark grey" to “black" properties. These samples were:
1) A Russian-language GUI for sending fraudulent SMS
messages from any international phone number. The
messages can contain links which download malware,
go to fake login pages, or hijack the recipient’s phone.
Interestingly, this program’s code checks for the existence
of Avast Anti-Virus.
2) DarkMailer v1.38i, a very fast bulk emailer which taps
into a network of zombie computers to send up to 500,000
emails per hour.
3) A video editing tool which was infected with Parasitic
Ramnit. Because of the Ramnit worm, each time this file
is run, it can infect more files: Windows executable files,
HTML files, Microsoft Office files, etc.
4) A Chinese-language chat program that is abused by a
malware parasitic.
5) LanAgent, an employee monitoring software which tracks
websites visited and email correspondences to “detect
activities that have nothing to do with work and will show
you how efficiently your employees spend their office
hours."
6) A version of MySQL Manager 2008 cracked by
"=iNViSiBLE=-", a known piracy group. This software
acts as if it is validly licensed without the user needing to
have a license. This kind of modification creates security
vulnerabilities which make it very easy to add a backdoor.
7) XRUMER, a search engine optimization program which
illicitly registers and post to forums with the goal of
boosting search engine rankings. This program can by-
pass security techniques for preventing spam, such as
email activation before posting, CAPTCHAs, and security
questions (e.g. what is 2+2?). The program uses HTTP
proxies in order to anonymize the source IP to make it
more difficult for administrators to block posts.
8) traceapi.dll, a shared library originally developed for
Microsoft Detours Express, which is used to hook func-
tionality of a process in order to supply back different
functionality. This is a Potentially Unwanted Program; it
was developed for a clean use case, but can be used to
abuse another process.
Additionally, 2/10 samples were actually “good". These
could be considered influential model mistakes, pointing to
potential deficiencies in feature repesentation:
1) An installer for CryptDrive, which can perform data
encryption.
2) Pharos Popup client, a printer driver for the public cloud
often used in academic settings. It is legitimate software,
but contains API calls that are, in conjunction, sometimes
associated with malicious behavior.
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